Psychology of Behavioral Safety
Many companies have spent a lot of time and effort improving
safety, usually by addressing hardware issues and installing safety
management systems that include regular (e.g. monthly) line management
safety audits. Over a number of years these efforts tend to produce
dramatic reductions in accident rates.
Often, however, a plateau of minor accidents remains that appears to
be stubbornly resistant to all efforts to remove them. Although many of
these are attributed to peoples' carelessness or poor safety attitudes,
most of these are triggered by deeply ingrained unsafe behaviors.
Behavioral Safety addresses these by making use of proven management
techniques which almost always results in a positive step change in
safety performance and safety attitudes.
Why Focus on Unsafe Behavior?
Although difficult to control, approximately 80-95 percent of all
accidents are triggered by unsafe behaviors, which tend to interact with
other negative features (termed Pathogens) inherent in workflow
processes or present in the working environment. Often inadvertently
introduced by the implementation of strategic plans, every organization
has its fair share of accident causing pathogens. These pathogens lie
dormant and are relatively harmless, until such time as two or more
combine and are triggered by an unsafe behavior to produce an accident.
Illustrating this, is a company that installed a new production
process that entailed designing and building two new mezzanine floors in
an existing plant. A project team had approved plans developed by plant
based engineers. Once the construction work was complete, it was found
that supporting girders had been installed five foot above the second
step of a staircase on both floors, thereby introducing two pathogens
into the physical environment. During commissioning of the process
equipment, product blockages were frequently found to occur in the
related pipe work (a third pathogen) that could only be cleared by going
to the top mezzanine floor where the inspection hatch was situated. Due
to increased production pressures and reduced manning resulting from a
downsizing exercise the blockage required the operator to isolate the
equipment at a lower production floor (another pathogen), and ascend the
stairs to the mezzanine floors to clear the pipe work. At this point
all these pathogens combined to trigger an accident when the operator
rushed up the stairs to clear the blockage. He ran into one of the low
girders, gashing his head and inflicting whiplash effects on his neck
while also knocking himself unconscious. This resulted in a reportable
accident, lost production and associated costs, etc.
In this true example, the potential for this type of lost-time
accident will always be present until such time as the pathogens are
addressed. Given that it is much more difficult to address these
resident pathogens, focusing attention upon the operator’s unsafe
behavior of running up the stairs is a much easier option as it is
within the operator's control, whereas the pathogens are not. Because
behavioral safety approaches identify and focus on particular sets of
unsafe behaviors, people tend to be more aware of their potential to
cause harm. In turn this gives people the mechanism by which they can
control their own safety behavior and that of their colleagues.
A focus upon unsafe behaviors also provides a much better index of
ongoing safety performance than accident rates for two reasons: First,
accidents are the end result of a causal sequence that is usually
triggered by an unsafe behavior; And second, unsafe behaviors can be
measured in a meaningful way on a daily basis. Accident rates tend to be
used as the primary outcome measure of safety performance simply
because they signal that something is wrong within the company's safety
management system. Because of the way they are calculated, they also
provide a crude benchmark by which companies can compare the
effectiveness of their safety management systems across industries.
Unfortunately, this tends to result in management attention and
resources being focused on safety only when accident rates rise
dramatically. When the immediate problems appear to be resolved,
management attention and resources are diverted to other pressing
organizational issues until such time as the accident rate rises once
again, and so on.
Consequently, rather than being proactive, those who focus almost
exclusively on accident rates as a measure of safety performance tend to
be reactive in their approach to safety. Conversely, a regular focus on
actual safety behavior is proactive as it allows other safety-related
issues in the accident causal chain to be identified and dealt with
before an incident occurs. Because 'safety behavior' is the unit of
measurement, a collaborative, problem-solving approach involving both
management and employees is adopted to identify critical sets of safe
and unsafe behaviors and used to develop 'Safety Behavior Inventories'
(See Cooper, 1998). These inventories provide the basis for personnel to
systematically monitor and observe their colleague’s ongoing safety
behavior, on a daily basis, in an enabling atmosphere. Based on the
first few weeks’ results of the peer monitoring, the workforce set their
own 'safety improvement' targets. Information feedback is then provided
on a weekly basis to allow the workgroups to track their progress in
reaching the safety improvement targets. Companies adopting this
approach are usually rewarded by fewer accidents, consistent safety
management, better communications and greater involvement in team
working, all of which can exert beneficial effects on production related
issues and bottom line profits.
Why Do People Behave Unsafely?
People often behave unsafely because they have never been hurt before
while doing their job in an unsafe way: 'I've always done the job this
way' being a familiar comment. This may well be true, but the potential
for an accident is never far away as illustrated by various accident
triangles. Heinrich's triangle, for example, suggests that for every 330
unsafe acts, 29 will result in minor injuries and 1 in a major or lost
time incident. Over an extended period of time, therefore, the lack of
any injuries for those who are consistently unsafe is actually
reinforcing the very behaviors that in all probability will eventually
lead them to be seriously injured. The principle being illustrated here
is that the consequences of behaving unsafely will nearly always
determine future unsafe behavior, simply because reinforced behavior
tends to be repeated.
Although it is not unusual to find the continuation of unsafe
behaviors being supported by more than one reinforcer, some will exert
stronger effects on peoples' behavior than others. This is particularly
the case for reinforcers that are soon, certain and positive. Smokers,
for example, find it hard to stop because the consequences of smoking
are soon (immediate), certain (every time) and positive (a nicotine top
up), whereas the negative consequences (e.g. lung cancer) are late (some
years away) and uncertain (not every smoker contracts or dies from lung
cancer). In exactly the same way, employees will find it hard to follow
certain safety rules and procedures if they are consistently (certain)
rewarded by an immediate (soon) timesaving that achieves extra
production (positive) by behaving unsafely. What would you do, for
example, if you were faced with a ten to fifteen minute period to put on
the correct clothing and equipment to enter a mandatory PPE area to
read a gauge that takes only 10 seconds?
In some instances, the actual workflow process also reinforces
peoples' unsafe behavior. By way of example, supermarket 'shelf'
stackers were required to replenish freezers with frozen foods.
Warehousemen fully load five-foot high, three-sided meshed trolleys with
large cartons of frozen foods. The stackers push the trolleys from the
warehouse and transfer the individual packages into the appropriate
freezer. Unfortunately, no provision was made for the storage or
disposal of empty cartons. To ensure customer access to the surrounding
freezers, while also avoiding the creation of tripping hazards, the
stackers were forced to place all the empty cartons on the top of the
trolley at the rear. This particular unsafe behavior had the potential
to injure both customers and stackers due to the trolley tipping over
when the last carton was removed from the trolley because of the
additional, unbalanced, weight. Nevertheless, it soon became part of the
stackers normal way of working, because their behavior was always
(certain) reinforced immediately (soon) by getting their job done
(positive) to maintain sales volume.
Unsafe behavior is sometimes further reinforced by line managers
turning a blind-eye, or actively encouraging employees to take
short-cuts for the sake of production. Unfortunately, this has negative
effects that are not always immediately apparent: First, employees learn
that unsafe behavior pays; Second, it wastes resources as the very
behaviors that companies spend a lot of time, money and effort trying to
eradicate are reinforced; and third, by condoning unsafe behavior, line
managers are transmitting conflicting messages that undermines
employee's confidence in the whole of management's commitment to safety.
How Do We Stop People Behaving Unsafely? Why not engineer out hazards?
Eliminating hazards by engineering them out or introducing physical
controls can be an effective way of limiting the potential for unsafe
behavior. While successful in many instances, it does not always work,
simply because people have the capacity to behave unsafely and override
any engineering controls.
For example, in attempts to reduce the number of fatalities
associated with quarry transport, companies install belt conveyers to
replace vehicles as the main haulage system for transporting extracted
minerals. To overcome major operational problems associated with these
conveyance systems (e.g. the spillage of minerals at transfer points
from the belt), engineer’s design and install belt scrapers to minimize
mineral build-ups at the pulleys to reduce belt distortion. Despite
these precautions, materials often build-up at the nip point between
belt and pulley. When this occurs, it is not unusual to find operators
removing the guards while the belt is still in operation to clear the
material build-up. Others are known to attempt to clear the moving
pulleys with iron bars or shovels. In both cases there is a high risk of
the tools becoming caught in the nip points of a pulley, and drawing
the operator in with serious consequences.
Clearly, despite the presence of the machine guards, operators often
believe that the consequences of behaving unsafely will be more than
repaid by continued production. This illustrates the point that many
engineering solutions tend to be reliant on peoples' 'rule following'
behavior (e.g. stopping the machinery before removing guards) but people
still have the capacity to ignore them and behave unsafely.
Thus, although engineering solutions have a strong place in safety management, they cannot be relied upon.
How Do We Stop People Behaving Unsafely? Why not change people’s attitudes?
Comments on accident reports often say 'So and So should take more
care. With better attitudes and safety awareness, this accident would
not have happened'. Where this occurs, attempts to change unsafe
behavior usually hinge upon the belief that attitudes determine behavior
(Indeed, this is a very common opinion amongst many safety
professionals). Remedies tend to rely on publicity campaigns and safety
training to bring about changes in people’s attitudes, which in turn is
expected to change people’s behavior. Although positive safety attitudes
are important and very desirable, the link from attitude change to
behavior change is very weak. This can be explained by the fact that a
single attitude comprises of at least three components: thinking
(cognitive), feeling (emotional), and the intention to act on it
(commitment). Additionally, a single attitude is usually linked with a
set of other related attitudes. Logic dictates, therefore, that attempts
at attitude change must target each individual component of each
individual attitude, for each single employee. In practical terms this
is nigh on impossible.
Fortunately, the link from behavior change to attitude change is much
stronger. If people consciously change their behavior, they also tend
to re-adjust their associated attitudes and belief systems to fit the
new behavior. This occurs because people try to reduce any tension
caused by a mismatch between their behavior and attitudes. Behavior
change, therefore, tends to lead to new belief and attitude systems that
buttress the new set of behaviors. This was demonstrated in a
manufacturing plant, where the safety climate of the company was
measured before introducing behavioral safety. Eighteen months later,
the company's safety climate was re-measured. Positive changes occurred
in six of seven topic areas (Cooper & Phillips, 2004).
An additional factor that enhances attitude change by focusing on
behavior is the positive reinforcement brought about by peer pressure.
Psychologists have known for some time that group membership demands
conformity to the groups' behavioral and attitudinal 'norms'. If a
workgroup adopts the 'norm' that 'thinking and behaving safely' is best
for all concerned, the group as a whole will tend to apply social
'sanctions' to the individual who deviates from this norm and behaves
unsafely. If people wish to remain a part of the social fabric of the
workgroup, they soon revert back to the safety norm and behave safely.
Importantly, this illustrates the point that workgroups will adopt a
collective definition of those behaviors, work practices or tasks that
are considered to be risky (Cooper, 1997). This fact lies at the very
heart of behavioral safety, simply because its essence is to help
workgroups positively redefine their own safety related 'norms.
How Do We Stop People Behaving Unsafely? Why not punish people until they behave safely?
Some approaches to safety management are heavily reliant on the use
of authority, fear and punishment (i.e. if you do not behave in a safe
manner at work you could be reprimanded, fined or even dismissed). These
approaches emphasize the use of discipline and punishment to discourage
unsafe behavior, while safe behavior is largely ignored. This often
results in the opposite of that intended (e.g. accident or near-miss
incidents are not reported for fear of sanctions). Although the
judicious use of discipline and punishment can have the intended
effects, more often than not it doesn't. The reason for this is quite
simple: The effectiveness of punishment is dependent upon its
consistency. It only works if is given immediately, and every single
time an unsafe behavior occurs. It is self-evident that punishing
someone every time they behave unsafely is a very difficult thing to do,
simply because they will not always be seen to do so by those in
authority. This means those soon, certain and positive reinforcers
gained from behaving unsafely will tend to outweigh any uncertain, late,
negative reinforcers received from inconsistent punishment.
Thus, although punishing those who deliberately put other people at
risk is a valid option, punishing people for everyday infractions of
safety rules (e.g. not wearing a hard hat) is a very difficult thing to
do consistently and does not address the underlying problems (e.g. the
hard hat is uncomfortable or gets in the way of doing the job safely).
In essence, therefore, punishment should be reserved: [1] to those who
deliberately put other people at risk; and [2] only after the
organization has done everything in its power to create the safest
working environment, provide the most comfortable protective equipment
and a persons' unsafe behavior is a consistent, willful act aimed at
flouting authority.
How can we stop unsafe behavior? Why not praise people for behaving safely?
So how can line management ensure that the reinforcers for working
safely outweigh those for working unsafely? It is a fact that most
people tend to respond more to praise and social approval than any other
factor. Think if you will, of people smoking their first cigarette.
This normally occurs during the teenage years because it is seen as the
'thing' to do. Although the cigarette smoke may taste foul and cause
severe coughing, people will continue to suffer the discomfort, if the
cigarette smoking behavior meets with their peer group's approval.
Likewise, some people may not use PPE or follow a procedure at work
because of their colleague’s disapproval: e.g. it goes against the
workgroup's macho image.
It makes sense, therefore, to make use of this phenomenon and praise
people for behaving safely (something very rarely done) to bring about
the required changes (Incentive and reward schemes reflect this
principle). Crucially, the effect of this is to explicitly link the
desired safe behavior to the praise received. Once the required behavior
pattern starts to become established, the timing and frequency of the
praise and social approval can be reduced over a period of time: i.e. it
doesn't need to be given immediately and every single time that someone
is seen to be behaving safely. Additional benefits include the
strengthening of a positive safety culture due to increased trust and
confidence between line managers and the workforce.
Thus, positive praise coupled with constructive feedback, tends to eliminate unsafe behavior.
What next?
We know that focusing on people's safety behavior will bring about
the desired changes and that attitude changes follow behavioral changes.
We know that social approval and encouragement can bring about positive
changes in safety 'norms'. We also know the workforce is best placed to
redefine their safety 'norms, as they control their own behavior. It
follows, therefore, that any safety improvement initiative which relies
almost exclusively on line management's efforts, is less likely to be as
successful as one that empowers and enables the workforce itself.
Accordingly, behavioral safety approaches are very much driven and
shaped by the workforce, in conjunction with line management. In this
way, the workforce is given responsibility and authority for
identifying, defining and monitoring their own safe and unsafe
behaviors, as well as setting their own 'safety improvement' targets. As
a result, workgroups are able to redefine their own safety related
'norms' in an enabling atmosphere. Line management facilitate this
process by providing the necessary resources and support to encourage
'employee ownership of safety', while also stressing that no individual
will be identified or disciplined as a result of the monitoring. In this
way a 'blame free' pro-active safety culture is created that is so
vital for long-term success.
Have we provided insights into many of the issues you face? If so,
perhaps now is the time for your company to consider behavioral safety
as the way forward. But you are wondering if it will work.....
Does it work?
Because the behavioral approach differs considerably from traditional
ways of improving safety, a question commonly asked is 'Do these ideas
work in practice?' Overwhelmingly, the answer is yes! Researchers from
around the globe have consistently reported positive changes in both
safety behavior and accident rates, regardless of the industrial sector
or company size (See references section). These include studies
conducted in construction, mining, engineering, bakeries, food
processing, manufacturing, oil & gas, shipbuilding and others (See
the references section particularly the reviews by McAfee &Winn,
1989 & Sulzer-Azeroff et al., 1994, Grindle et al, 2000). Positive
results have also been obtained by the author and colleagues over the
last decade in many sectors of the UK, Irish and US economies, such as
Construction (Duff et al., 1993), Manufacturing (Cooper et al., 1994),
Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, Paper, Foods, Steel, Paints and Offshore Oil
& Gas. Typical results include:
1. 40-75 percent reductions in accident rates and accident costs year on year
2. 20-30 percent improvements in safety behavior year on year
3. Greater workforce involvement in safety
4. Better communications between management and the workforce
5. Ongoing improvements to Safety Management Systems
6. Improved Safety Climates
7. Greater 'ownership' of safety by the workforce
8. More positive attitudes towards safety
9. Greater individual acceptance of responsibility for safety.
Thus Behavioral Safety has a lot to offer to the world of work,
although it must be stressed that it is not a panacea to cure all ills.
References
Cooper, M.D.(1998) Improving Safety Culture: A Practical Guide. J. Wiley & Sons, Chichester.
Cooper, M.D. & Phillips, R.A.(2004) Exploratory Analysis of the
Safety Climate and Safety Behavior Relationship. Journal of Safety
Research, 35, 497-512.
Cooper, M.D., Phillips, R.A.,Sutherland, V.J. & Makin, P.J.
(1994) 'Reducing accidents using goal- setting and feedback: A field
study'. Journal of Occupational & Organisational Psychology, Vol 67,
219-40.
Duff, A.R., Robertson, I.T., Cooper, M.D. & Phillips, R.A. (1993)
'Improving safety on construction sites by changing personnel
behavior'. H.M.S.O. Report Series CRR51/93:H.M.S.O. ISBN 011 882 1482;
London.
McAfee, R.B. & Winn, A.R. (1989) 'The use of incentives/feedback
to enhance workplace safety: A critique of the literature'. Journal of
Safety Research, Vol 20, 7-19.
Sulzer-Azeroff, B., Harris, T.C.,& Blake- McCann, K. (1994)
'Beyond Training: Organizational Performance Management Techniques'.
Occupational Medicine: State of the Art Reviews, Vol 9(2), 321-339.
Source : www.behavioral-safety.com by www.safetyflash.blogspot.com
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